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1  Introduction 
 
This article aims at disclosing general features of the transfer pattern to the Continent, exemplified for 
some particular countries. Special attention is given to the international trade flows in iron producs as 
they form an integal part of this transfer. The composition and contents of the present book make it 
superfluous to give a thorough account of the transition process in the UK (for this see the chapter by 
Evans). As a background for my description and analysis of the transfer of these mineral techniques to 
some selected Continental countries during the second half of the 18
th century and the first decades of the 
19
th century some typical features in the UK herself will be highlighted, though. The period dealt with is 
confined to the time before the crucial demand of railway construction made iron industries in France, 
Belgium and Germany completely switch to the economically successful British model. For a brief 
summary account of the railway age see Fremdling (2002, pp. 216-219). The developments in France 
and Belgium will be put into front here but I will refer to other countries as Germany as well. 
 
Both for Britain and most countries on the Continent following later, the transition from an 
organic / wood economy towards a mineral-fuel / coal economy (Wrigley 1988) raises the question of 
‘Why the delay?’(Landes 1972, p. 126). Landes asked this question when comparing the Continental 
achievements in industrial performance with those of Britain around the Crystal Palace World Exhibition 
in 1851. At bottom, the question can even be turned against Britain, though. Going beyond Landes’ 
linear retrospective view on British accomplishments and Continental failures one might see Britain’s 
transition to a coal-based technology as a rather long-drawn desperate attempt to overcome the scarce 
endowment with the most important natural resource of the organic economy, namely wood. In this 
view, Great Britain was the first country to resort to an Industrial Revolution in order to overcome the 
bottleneck of running short of wood. This limit to growth had hit Britain earlier than most parts of the 
Continent. Within a sketch of a broader framework at the end of my essay, I will try to explain, why the 
differences between the British and Continental technologies persisted for such a long time or even held 
on (e.g. Sweden). But before that, a brief introduction into the primary  iron industry is given with a 
simplified model of the production stages and processes. Figure 1 distinguishes between traditional and 
modern methods of producing and processing wrought iron.  
 
Figure 1 
Primary wrought iron industry 
Process   
Stage of Production  traditional  modern 
 
Product 
Smelting in the blast furnace   
First Stage  with charcoal  with coke 
 
pig iron 
Refining   
Second Stage  in a hearth with 
charcoal 




Shaping   
  by the hammer  by a rolling mill 
 
bar iron (rails) 
 
In the pre-industrial or traditional method, the iron was smelted in the blast furnace by using 
charcoal as a fuel. Charcoal (which is derived from wood) was then substituted for by mineral fuel   2 
(mainly coke derived from coal). The output, ‘pig iron’, contained a lot of impurities and a high content 
of carbon. Therefore it was brittle and could not be shaped in a cold or warm state. The only way to use 
it directly for final products was to cast it in a molten state into forms for cast iron products. To some 
extent, this was done directly with the molten pig iron flowing out from the blast furnace. Indirectly it 
was done by reheating the pig iron again before the casting. In order to produce wrought iron the pig iron 
had to be refined, which in essence meant a reduction of carbon. By refining (the second stage of the 
primary iron production), wrought iron was obtained, which could be shaped into the desired bars or 
rails. These were elastic enough, not brittle any more and could endure mechanical shocks without 
breaking easily. Distinguishing between the two stages of production is essential, because smelting on 
the one hand and refining/shaping on the other were not necessarily integrated in one production unit or 
even at the same location. This rough outline of the production process in the primary iron industry is 
necessary to comprehend the specific transition from an iron industry based on wood-fuel to an iron 
industry based on mineral-fuel. On the Continent, some traditional and some modern methods were 
combined in the two stages of production, which were often performed in different independent 
locations. Within the history of technology, such interplay of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is still too neglected an 
issue.  
 
In the UK, it took the iron industry almost one century to proceed from charcoal to mineral fuel. 
The British model of smelting, refining and shaping iron (see Figure 2) was framed by two benchmark 
innovations, namely Abraham Darby’s coke-fired blast furnace of 1709 and Cort’s puddling and rolling 
process of 1784. Within the 18
th century, the British iron industry transformed itself from a small 
producer at high cost to the leading supplier of iron products for the world market. With the new 





The British model (wrought iron) 
Process   
Stage of Production  traditional  modern 
 
Product 
Smelting in the blast furnace   
First Stage    with coke 
 
pig iron 
Refining   
Second Stage    in a puddling furnace with coal 
 
wrought iron 
Shaping   
    by arolling mill 
 
bar iron (rails) 
 
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British iron industry was not only free from any real 
competition in her domestic market, but was increasingly able to export much of her output abroad. 
From 1815 to 1830, ‘exports usually amounted to between one-quarter and one-third of total output’ 
(Hyde 1977, pp. 144, 172). From 1830 to 1870, exports jumped from one-quarter to roughly 60 per cent 
of total pig iron production. From a British point of view, on the basis of available aggregate figures, it   3 
seems quite appropriate to conclude that British ironmasters ‘maintained and perhaps strengthened the 
strong international competitive position they had established in the early part of the century’ (Hyde 
1977, p. 173). This conclusion is supported by rather crude evidence, using aggregate export figures in 
relation to aggregate output figures. They inevitably conceal the considerable  structural changes 
affecting Britain’s competitive position in foreign markets, which took place from the 1820s onwards. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 There are numerous books and articles on the development of the British iron industry. I mainly draw on the 
standard work by Hyde (1977). Concerning output, see Riden (1977), the summary account by Harris (1988) and 
the classical articles edited by Church (1994). Furthermore, see Fremdling (2000) and Evans (in this book).    29 
Table 1 
British iron exports, 1821-1870, thousands of metric tonnes, percentages and ratios, annual averages. 

























1821/25  4.5  4.6  56.3  28.4  30.5  7.2  12.6  11.4  8.5 
1826/30  8.5  14.3  43.5  23.4  49.3  11.7  4.4  14.9  7.3 
1831/35  21.6  13.0  22.5  44.9  76.4  12.1  2.0  27.8  4.4 
1836/40  44.5  23.2  26.5  24.8  112.8  13.3  1.3  37.6  3.2 
1841/45  103.7  43.7  17.7  17.4  183.0  28.6  1.8  22.8  2.2 
1846/50  165.0  26.5  13.4  38.0  304.3  11.9  0.5  49.9  2.3 
1851/55  276.4  26.1  12.9  37.8  575.7  7.1  2.4  56.8  2.6 








d  2.5 








d  1.7 








d  1.7 
Notes:  a) Holland is included because exports to Dutch ports were very often transit trade to Germany. 
  b) For bar iron a multiplier of 1.25 was used to obtain pig iron equivalents. Bar iron divided through pig iron. 
  c) Without railway iron. 
  d) Railway iron. 
Source: See Appendix.   31
The bulk of British iron exports were made up of pig iron, bar iron and rails. Unfortunately, 
British export statistics subsumed rails under the category of bar iron, until 1855. In subsequent years, 
when railway iron was registered separately, it constituted more than 50 per cent of bar iron. The growth 
of these exports between 1821 and 1870 is shown in Table 1. To analyse the pace of this growth, I 
calculated average yearly growth rates. Whereas pig iron exports grew by a remarkable 11 per cent, 
bar iron, including rails still achieved the impressive growth rate of nearly 7.5 per cent. Both figures are 
well above the average yearly growth rate of British pig iron production, which amounted to 5.6 per cent 
(Riden 1977). They demonstrate quite patently the increasing dependency of the British iron industry on 
export markets. Not only did the product mix of British iron exports shift towards the lower stages of 
production (from bar iron to pig iron, as shown by the ratio in Table 1), but above all, Britain could only 
enlarge her export markets, especially after 1850, by diverting her incremental deliveries from her 
closest Continental competitors, namely Belgium, France and Germany - constituting the European core 
- to the periphery and to the developing world.  
 
2  Transfer patterns to the Continent: Coke smelting and castings 
 
In Britain, the diffusion of coke-smelting did not get momentum before the 1750s, or even 1760s, 
although in Coalbrookdale it had been a viable commercial process of producing cast iron products 
directly from the molten coke pig iron, from 1709 onwards. The now classical explanation for the rather 
belated diffusion of coke smelting origins from Hyde (1977), who maintains that charcoal prices had not 
increased sharply before the 1750s / 60s. Evans (see his chapter in this book) however challenged this 
view by pointing out that Hyde had not presented any convincing quantitative evidence: According to 
Hyde’s own data, variable costs of charcoal smelting during the 1720s even were as high as in the 1750s 
/ 60s. For Evans himself it remains rather a mystery, what iron masters had convinced to increasingly 
apply coke smelting from then on. Without yet being able to substantiate his supposition, Evans states 
that there must have been a major technological breakthrough. The only example of such a breakthrough 
he mentions is that of the cast iron blowing cylinders for the blast furnace. Isaac Wilkinson received a 
patent on this innovation in 1757. I basically concur with Evans‘ supposition, although I rather believe 
in the power of various minor innovations than in  the major technological breakthrough. My 
hypothetical explanation is based on the fact that the technology of producing cast  iron products 
improved considerably during that period. Whereas in the time from the 1750s to the 1780s the 
production of pig iron increased threefold, bar iron production just doubled (Fremdling 1986, pp. 30 f.). 
New casting techniques had been developed  with the coke pig iron being molten again in a 
reverberatory or cupola furnace fired by coal. The rather homogeneous molten pig iron could be cast 
into complicated forms and high quality cast iron products resulted.
2 The best known example is the still 
existing Iron Bridge crossing the Severn near Coalbrookdale, built between 1777 and 1781. Moreover, 
much of the machinery of the industrial revolution including the cylinders of steam engines was made 
from cast iron. Cast iron products served various purposes. As they were cheap they even replaced 
goods hitherto made from wrought iron (details in Hyde 1977, p. 128; Beck 1897, p. 755 ff.). And last 
but not least: ‘The cannon and shot, as well as the small arms used against Napoleon, were cast in 
British foundries’ (Hyde 1977, p. 128). In order to produce accurate cylinders for steam engines or 
cannons, new drilling techniques had been developed. Best known for this achievement is John 
                                                 
2 For technical details, see Beck 1897, pp. 380-385; 753-756.   32
Wilkinson, Isaac’s son. There is a lot of evidence that foreign metallurgists visiting British iron works 
during the second half of the 18
th century were highly interested in precisely these casting techniques, 
which allowed the production of superior and cheaper cast iron goods for civil and above all military 
purposes (cannons).
3  I agree, however, with Broadberry’s (1997, p. 78) principal notion, that all 
countries or entrepreneurs have access to a common pool of knowledge. Thus concepts of ‘industrial 
espionage’ (Harris 1988), which are very common with technical historians, divert from the principle 
economic problem of technology transfer or diffusion. 
 
On his travels through Europe during the 1760s, the French metallurgist Jars also visited British 
iron works. He neither got acquainted with the then modern processes of stamping and potting for 
making wrought iron from coke pig iron, though, nor did he even believe that this type of pig iron would 
be a useful input for wrought iron at all. Jars’ description of the new British  casting techniques, 
however, attracted the curiosity of several experts from the Continent. Besides Jars and other Frenchmen 
as De la Houlière, Swedish metallurgists, who throughout the 18
th century knew and described the state 
of the art minutely, regularly visited Britain. Furthermore, Prussian civil servants as Heynitz and von 
Reden made their technological travels to this country (Weber 1976). Although these visitors did get 
acquainted with the new British methods of producing wrought iron with coal (stamping and potting and 
even Cort’s puddling) they were n ot impressed by the outcome of these processes. They obviously 
considered the coal-based products as inferior to bar iron produced by means of charcoal pig iron. The 
new casting  techniques with coke pig iron taken as an input, however, convinced the French and 
Prussian governments to introduce these techniques into their countries. Together with the Frenchman 
Wendel, John Wilkinson’s brother William in 1776 got a contract for establishing these techniques at 
the coalfields of Creuzot (Woronoff 1984). Already before its total collapse in 1814, this enterprise 
failed both economically and technically. For instance, the cannons produced between 1788 and 1793 
were too brittle. In my opinion, it is short-sighted to blame the quality of the inputs for this failure 
(Harris 1978, pp. 258 f.); for from 1836 onwards, based on the same local raw materials as at the end of 
18
th century (Roy 1962) the brothers Schneider set out to make Le Creusot one of the most successful 
engineering and iron works of France. 
 
The Prussian government tried to introduce the coke blast furnace early in Upper Silesia and 
eventually they planned the adoption of British cast iron techniques for producing cylinders and cannons 
from this input. In 1788, William Wilkinson spent four months as a Prussian adviser (Weber 1976, p. 
227). In contrast to Le Creusot, the Prussian civil servants von Reden and Heynitz opted for a stepwise 
introduction of the coal techniques. And at a very early date indeed, ironworks in Upper Silesia did 
succeed in smelting iron ore in a coke blast furnace. The state-owned ironworks of Malapane, Gleiwitz 
and Königshütte (Krolewska Huta) were the very first on the Continent to continuously use coke for 
smelting pig iron.  
 
The meanwhile prevailing view (including my earlier writings on the subject) namely the 
reproach that Prussian technocrats modernised only an enclave of the iron industry has to be modified 
considerably, however. Although von Reden in 1789/90 and other experts clearly got acquainted with 
e.g. Cort’s innovations, they obviously did not intend to introduce British methods of producing wrought 
                                                 
3 In the following, I mainly draw on Harris 1988.    33
iron altogether. Why should they, if their region did not suffer from a serious shortage of wood yet and 
Continental observers during the second half of the 18
th century generally regarded coke pig iron as an 
inferior input for wrought iron and the refining methods of stamping/potting (and later puddling) as 
inferior to Continental forge practises? The term of  ‘inferior’  refers both to prices and quality.  
 
It was otherwise with cast iron: On (British) coke pig iron in combination with new casting 
techniques Continental observers very well conferred the superiority (or at least a viable alternative or 
complementarity) to Continental practises. Hence the endeavour, to solely transfer casting techniques to 
the Continent during the second half of the 18
th century.  
 
As a provisional result, the attitude of contemporary observers, might be summed up as follows: 
In most respects, the British iron industry of the 18
th century was regarded as different, unique and in 
parts even as backward. This in any case in comparison towards Swedish best practises. 
 
3  Transfer patterns to the Continent: Coke smelting and puddling / rolling 
 
What consequences did the process innovations of the coke-using blast furnace, the puddling furnace 
and the rolling mill entail on the iron industries in continental Europe during the 19
th century? According 
to David Landes’ statement that these innovations were highly superior to the traditional procedures 
both technically and economically, the new techniques ought to have spread over continental Europe 
rapidly.
4 This implies that the old-fashioned iron industry based on charcoal should have perished fast 
and instead of, as formerly, being spread all over the country the modern iron industry should have 
clustered round the coalfields. This did not occur for quite a long time, though. So David Landes’ 
statement does not prove to be correct. He mixed up technical with economic superiority and thus - 
unjustly  - blamed Continental entrepreneurs for not quickly adopting the seemingly ‘superior’ 
technology.
5 In Great Britain, the new techniques had indeed surpassed the old ones as well 
economically by the end of the eighteenth century, but such a supplantation does not hold in most 
regions on the Continent. Here, traditional or partly modernised procedures could endure very well 
within their innate districts and with their markets of old. Moreover, when spreading over continental 
Europe the new techniques did not follow the British model strictly. Great Britain as the cheapest 
supplier worldwide (on the world market and on regional markets) created conditions to which 
Continental regions reacted in different ways.
6 
 
3.1  Indirect, embodied transfer  
 
A process innovation may provoke adaptations in other economic regions by being transmitted there 
directly and also by any trade in the new products that embody the new technology. At the beginning of 
the 19
th century, British producers were undoubtedly the cheapest suppliers of iron internationally, but 
foreign ironmasters were protected from imports, firstly by tariff barriers, secondly by transportation 
                                                 
4 ‘Why the delay? Surely, the hardest task would seem to have been the original creative acts that produced coke 
smelting, the mule, and the steam engine. In view of the enormous economic superiority of these innovations, one 
would expect the rest to have followed automatically.’ Landes (1972, p. 126). 
5 On this very common fallacy, see Rosenberg (1976, pp. 189-210).   34
costs and thirdly by differences in the quality of the iron, which meant a price threshold. The French, 
Belgian and German iron industries based on charcoal, which despite increasing productivity were 
finally doomed to extinction, could thus survive and even expand well until the the 1850s. In the long 
run, however, these artificial, natural and quality barriers were turned down or disappeared completely, 
and British iron definitely became competitive on Continental markets for a long time. On the other 
hand, protection allowed the emergence of iron industries based on mineral fuel even where the natural 
resource endowment was less favourable than in Britain. This became evident when railway 
construction led to a sharp increase in demand for mass-produced iron and a modern iron industry 
emerged within a relatively short period. Britain herself helped her foreign competitors to accelerate the 
catching-up process by delivering vast amounts of cheap coke pig iron, which was worked up in 
foundries and rolling mills abroad (e.g. the Ruhr).  
 
British growing iron exports showed fluctuating market shares for different customers.Even the 
long-term development of demand for British iron was uneven, both in relation to the prominence of 
individual importing countries and the balance between pig iron and bar iron. The main clue to the 
fluctuations and shifts in the composition of British iron exports must therefore be found outside Britain, 
as her position as lowest cost producer was already established at the beginning of this period. It is the 
internal development of the importing countries that has to be scrutinised for an appropriate explanation 
of these changes. Here I concentrate on France and Belgium with brief references to some German 
states. 
 
The French example during the first years of peace in the 19
th century illustrates how powerfully 
British exports of bar iron produced with coal threatened the indigenous iron industry. The protective 
tariff France levied on bar iron had been adjusted according to Swedish prices in 1814. That was 
founded on the fact that Sweden had become the price leader and the most important exporter of bar iron 
beside Russia during the 18
th century. For bar iron imports from Sweden this protective tariff might have 
sufficed indeed. Apparently unexpectedly, however, a new competitor gained against French 
ironmasters in their indigenous market, namely rolled iron, produced with coal, from Great Britain. In 
spite of the tariffs of 1814 it had a marked price advantage in several regional markets, in particular in 
places accessible by waterway such as Paris. (The ratio of imports to production accounted for around 
16 per cent in 1821). Urged by their ironmasters, the French government raised the tariffs to keep off 
this perceptible competition. Doubling the price of British bar iron in the Channel ports, this new tariff 
was practically prohibitive. In Table 2 the decline of British bar iron exports to France after 1822 is 
clearly seen.
7 Only in the 1850s was the tariff reduced enduringly. Thus the tariff of 1822 artificially 
lengthened the proper geographical distance between Great Britain and France. The defence against an 
import of the new technology as it was embodied in the new iron products suppressed any import 
competition that would have forced the French iron making regions into adaptations. The tariff policy 
succeeded in shielding the new products from France indeed, but the process innovations still made their 
way into the country.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 For detailed data, see Fremdling (1986) or the article published in English (1991a).  
7 British pig iron kept a considerable market share in France, because of  the demand from foundries. For an 
extended discussion, see my English publication on the French case (1998).   35
During the 1820s, Belgium was part of the Kingdom of the United Netherlands. British exports 
of bar iron hardly penetrated into the markets and production centres of the old-established iron industry 
of Wallonia. In the free trade tradition of Holland rather moderate duties prevailed thus preventing 
import duties as in France. The huge iron and machinery work of Cockerill at Seraing near Liège tried to 
get supply of British iron. As it received nothing but incidental deliveries in the end Cockerill rather 
relied on cheaper or qualitatively better procurements; that is: his own production, local supplies and 
still deliveries from traditional German producers of high quality bar iron, e.g. Remy in Neuwied at the 
banks of the Rhine (Fremdling 1986, pp. 67-80).  
 
After the separation of Belgium from the United Netherlands, iron masters enforced 
considerably higher import duties on iron deliveries from Britain. At the beginning of the 1830s, duties 
on pig iron imports increases fourfold while those on bar iron augmented by mere 40 % at valorem. This 
recourse to higher duties changed in the late 1850s, and finally stopped, when Belgium joined the free 
trade area of the Cobden-Chevalier-Treaty in 1861. Overlooking the entire period from the 1830s to the 
1860s, British iron exports never ingrained deeply in the Belgian market. Only in extreme cyclical 
downturns with low prices in Britain, e.g. 1837 and 1838, did British exports enter the Belgian domestic 
market. In the long run, Belgian ironmasters not only secured their domestic markets but succeeded in 
exporting their products to neighbouring countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Above 
all, they competed with British suppliers on remote markets as Italy and in the 1860s, they even 
penetrated into the British domestic market (Fremdling 1986, pp. 234-248).  
   36
Table 2 
French Iron Imports, 1815-1828, thousands of metric tons and percentages 












1815  6.9       
1816  4.0       
1817  13.8       
1818  10.1       
1819  10.7       
1820  8.9  76.8  10.1  ? 
1821  13.8  79.2  4.9  ? 
1822  5.1  48.5  8.1  37.1 
1823  4.5  33.7  6.7  53.9 
1824  5.8  17.7  3.0  67.1 
1825  6.1  ?  ?  ? 
1826  9.6  ?  ?  ? 
1827  7.3  6.7  0.7  74.3 
1828  6.6  15.9  0.3  72.3 
 
                                         Pig Iron  (fonte brute) 
 
1815  0.9       
1816  2.3       
1817  2.8       
1818  3.4       
1819  2.7       
1820  5.4       
1821  7.7  35.6  42.0  - 
1822  8.3  30.7  41.5  - 
1823  7.8  41.7  39.0  - 
1824  7.2  24.9  47.4  - 
1825  7.4  ?  ?  - 
1826  11.4  ?  ?  - 
1827  7.8  28.6  46.1  - 
1828  8.8  29.9  44.2  - 
All figures are related to the “commerce spécial”, i.e. imports entering the French market for consumption. 
Sources: See Appendix. 
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Table 3 
French Iron Production, Imports and Exports, 1825-1870, 























1824/30  220.9  8.8  0.9  -0.81  0.04 
1831/40  293.6  13.4  0.4  -0.94  0.04 
1841/50  447.2  49.9  0.4  -0.98  0.11 













































1825/30  148.6  6.9  0.5  -0.86  0.04 
1831/40  195.2  5.6  0.5  -0.84  0.03 
1841/50  301.7  6.7  0.8  -0.80  0.02 




























1  Including rails 
a  The “commerce spécial” is a category in which imports allowed under the system of “admission 
temporaire” are not included. It can be corrected by means of  following formula: S = commerce spécial; G = 
commerce général (MG – MS) – (XG – XS). 
Sources: See Appendix.   38
Table 4 
German
























1825/30  56.8  3.8  3.5  -0.03  0.004 
1831/33  71.0  5.0  1.9  -0.45  0.04 
1834/40  149.0  14.2  1.8  -0.77  0.08 
1841/50  196.4  75.2  1.8  -0.95  0.37 
1851/60  411.5  150.5  5.3  -0.93  0.35 
























1825/30  34.1  3.7  1.8  -0.35  0.06 
1831/33  40.7  5.3  3.4  -0.22  0.05 
1834/40  66.0  13.1  2.3  -0.71  0.16 
1841/50  128.4  35.2  2.2  -0.88  0.26 
1851/60  257.6  20.1  6.1  -0.53  0.05 
1861/70  528.5  13.9  28.8  0.35  -0.03 
1  Until 1833 Prussia; from then on the Zollverein 
2  Including rails 
Sources: See Appendix.   39
Table 5 
Belgian Iron Production, Imports and Exports, 1841-1870, 

























a  1.4  37.4  0.93  -0.34 
1846/50  178.5  0.3  74.9  0.99  -0.42 
1851/55  231.1  0.1  78.6  1.00  -0.34 
1856/60  317.4  2.8  53.4  0.90  -0.16 
1861/65  396.2  10.4  28.2  0.46  -0.04 







Imports             Exports 
of Bar Iron and Rails 












b  0.4  3.5  0.79  -0.10
b 
1846/50  69.1  0.2  3.1  0.88  -0.04 
1851/55  104.2  0.2  12.3  0.97  -0.12 
1856/60  182.1  0.6  35.5  0.97  -0.19 





1866/70  423.4  3.0  162.9  0.96  -0.38 
a  1841-1844 estimated by Fremdling (1986, p. 78) 
b  1845 only 
c  1861-1864 
Sources: See Appendix.   40
The competitive position of the three Continental countries is revealed in Tables 3 to 5. Exports and 
imports are compared by using the Balassa Index. It ranges from + 1 to  -1, where a positive value 
reveals a comparative advantage and a negative one the opposite. Furthermore, net foreign trade in pig 
and bar iron is expressed in relation to domestic production (see the last two columns of the respective 
tables).  
 
French ironmasters clearly had a comparative disadvantage in foreign trade during the entire 
time span from the 1820s to the 1850s. With the system of  ‘admission temporaire’in the 1850s and 
moderate free trade in the 1860s this improved to some extent for bar iron. In general, however, foreign 
trade never gained very high proportions compared with production (Table 3).  
In Germany, the ironmasters revealed an increasing comparative disadvantage concerning pig iron from 
the 1820s to the 1850s. Extremely high shares of net imports accompanied this in the 1840s and 1850s. 
Concerning bar iron and rails, this dependence on imports was even more pronounced during the same 
decades. The last two columns of Table 4, however, also show the process of import substitution in the 
1850s and 1860s. In the last decade, Germany even became a net exporter of bar iron and rails.  
 
Belgian ironmasters revealed a comparative advantage in foreign trade throughout from the 
1840s to the 1860s. Concerning pig iron, this changed from the late 1850s to the 1860s. The export 
quotas showed high values for pig iron mainly in the 1840s and early 1850s, which were due to 
preferential tariff rates to France and Germany. The significant growth of the export quotas for bar iron 
and railway iron in the 1850s and 1860s reveals the increasing comparative advantage in the segment 
internationally (Table 5).  
 
3.2   Direct transfer  
 
So far, I have concentrated on the British innovations as they were embodied in products, the import of 
which changed the regional economic pattern in the importing countries. Before railway construction on 
the Continent demanded huge quantities of wrought iron mainly for rails, for which low quality iron 
sufficed, Wallonia was the only Continental region to follow the British model successfully (Reuss et al. 
1960). Since the middle of the 1820s, numerous works comprising coke blast furnaces as well as 
puddling and rolling mills were built there in the coal mining areas around Liège and Charleroi. 
Excelling the others, John Cockerill’s factory at Seraing integrated all stages of production, from 
engineering to the supply of raw materials, as early as 1825. The natural locational factors of Wallonia 
were similar to those in British iron producing regions with ore and coal situated closely together. 
Transportation costs and moderate protective duties screened Wallonia from the British competition 
while an ambitious government programme for industrial development was established on the British 
model (Fremdling and Gales 1994). There were mainly two additional factors that favoured the Walloon 
iron i ndustry: firstly, its vicinity to its customers, and secondly, the relatively high cost level of the 
traditional iron industry. In such an economic environment the technology transplanted from Britain 
could prosper. In the long tradition of processing wrought iron (for nails and  
 
Rhineland, in the 1820s. Thus the establishment of the new technology there was not confined 
from the first by sales problems, as it was the case with most of the modern ironworks in France. In 
Wallonia as well, it took the modern iron industry more than 20 years to push aside the traditional   41
competition. While the old-fashioned way of smelting iron with charcoal in the 1840s still dominated in 
Germany and France, it had already retreated into niches of the market in Wallonia. During the 1840s, 
roughly 90 per cent of the pig iron was smelted by the use of coke (Fremdling 2000, p. 212). Table 6 
shows the development of the Belgian pig iron production. As early as during the middle of  the 1830s, 
the mineral-fuel technique had surpassed pig iron produced with the use of charcoal. For the production 
of bar iron, it is not possible to produce figures that delimit both techniques (Table 7). The sheer number 
of puddling furnaces indicates a higher production in the modern segment of the market. One should not 
forget, however, that to some extent puddling furnaces refined pig iron, which originated from charcoal 
blast furnaces. This mixing of old and new techniques became highly important in France and played a 
role Germany as well.  
 
Table 6 
Pig Iron Output in Belgium, 1811-1870 in 1000 metric tons 
Year  with charcoal  with coke  total output 
1811  39.1    39.1 
       
1822  30    30 
       
1825  35    35 
       
1828  ?  ?  47.0 
       
1830  40.7  12.0  52.7 
1831  31.5  13.5  45.0 
1832  22.2  15.1  37.3 
1833  25.7  19.7  45.4 
1834  29.9  28.3  58.2 
1835  34.6  45.5  80.2 
1836  39.6  68.4  108.0 
1837  39.6  85.1  124.7 
1838  46.8  72.2  119.0 
1839  31.2  66.3  97.5 
       
1840  30.6  74.2  104.8 
1841  30.0  82.0  112.0 
1842  9.0  75.6  84.6 
1843  19.8  86.0  105.8 
1844  15.6  101.2  116.8 
1845  13.5  121.1  134.6 
1846  19.9  169.4  189.3 
1847  26.1  222.3  248.4 
1848  19.1  142.5  161.6 
1849  14.0  134.5  148.5   42
       
1850  13.3  131.1  144.5 
1851  13.8  153.9  167.7 
1852  10.8  168.0  178.8 
1853  9.7  220.4  230.1 
1854  11.7  273.2  284.8 
1855  14.1  280.1  294.3 
1856  15.9  306.0  321.9 
1857  14.5  287.8  302.2 
1858  11.5  312.7  324.2 
1859  9.6  309.2  318.8 
       
1860  5.3  314.9  319.9 
1861  5.9  305.9  311.8 
1862  3.6  352.9  356.5 
1863  6.1  386.0  392.1 
1864  5.5  444.3  449.8 
1865  4.6  466.2  470.8 
1866  0.6  481.8  482.4 
1867  1.3  421.7  423.0 
1868  0.9  434.9  435.8 
1869  2.2  532.2  534.3 
1870  1.8  563.5  565.3 
Notes and Sources: See Appendix. 
Table 7 
Wrought Iron Output and Number of Refinery Furnaces in Belgium, 1845-1870 
Year  Output 




with coal (puddling) 
1845  62.3  137  161 
1846  67.1  130  164 
1847  80.9  124  206 
1848  57.8  124  196 
1849  67.1  125  204 
1850  72.7  131  192 
       
1851  74.6  131  201 
1852  76.6  124  210 
1853  110.8  118  257 
1854  114.2  116  270 
1855  144.6  113  282 
1856  180.0  110  298 
1857  176.2  99  309 
1858  161.3  85  285   43
1859  174.8  92  295 
1860  218.3  85  314 
       
1861  236.9  79  339 
1862  260.5  65  390 
1863  279.8  59  417 
1864  343.9  56  525 
1865  349.7  51  558 
1866  388.3  33  518 
1867  362.0  34  495 
1868  350.1  22  528 
1869  494.1  16  670 
1870  522.6  15  714 
Sources: See Appendix.   44
In France, the conditions after 1822 seemed to favour establishing British type ironworks 
(Figure 2: The British model). By then, imports from Britain had shown that there was a demand for 
coal iron. With the customs policy guaranteeing a high price level, a big profit seemed to be in prospect. 
In expectation of this, ironworks shot up in the coal districts of the Loire valley and the Massif Central, 
from 1822 onwards. Following the British model, they were originally built as big ironworks comprising 
several stages of production. These new establishments, however, had no economic success until far into 
the 1830s. Technical problems at the outset were solved little by little but the new locations presented 
serious shortcomings. Other than in Britain, iron ore had to be transported from afar, which raised the 
costs of production enormously. Moreover, the sites of the new iron industry were located far away from 
the centres of consumption, which made the sale dearer. To make matters worse, in these centres the 
new products had to compete with those the traditional or partly modernised iron industry offered in a 
superior quality .The newcomers could not undercut the prices of the old-established firms low enough 
for them to enter the markets permanently. Thus for a long time, the changing economic structure of the 
coal mining areas did not entail the decline of the traditional iron producing regions (See Tables 8 and 9; 
Roy 1962, Vial 1967, Gille 1968, Belhoste 1994). The same holds true for German regions.  
 
Table 8 
Pig Iron Output in France, 1819-1870 in 1000 metric tons 
Year  with charcoal  with coke or mixed fuel  total 
production 









from pig iron 
 
1819  110.5    2.0    112.5 
1822  107.8    3.0    110.8 
1824  192.3    5.3    197.6 
1825  194.2    4.4    198.6 
1826  200.3    5.6    205.8 
1827  209.1    7.4    216.4 
1828  199.3    21.8    220.9 
1829  190.0    27.1    217.1 
           
1830  239.3    27.1    266.4 
1831  197.2    27.6    224.8 
1832  194.7    30.3    225.0 
1833  196.8    39.3    236.1 
1834  185.8  36.1  43.3  3.8  269.1 
1835  208.3  38.2  46.0  2.3  294.8 
1836  223.3  38.8  43.1  3.2  308.4 
1837  223.1  45.8  59.3  3.5  331.7 
1838  235.1  43.2  65.2  4.2  347.8 
1839  239.2  44.5  62.7  3.8  350.2 
             45
1840  223.5  47.2  69.1  8.0  347.8 
1841  219.9  72.0  61.3  23.9  377.1 
1842  223.5  73.7  77.4  24.9  399.5 
1843  232.1  59.7  104.6  26.3  422.6 
1844  217.5  63.1  109.8  36.8  427.2 
1845  205.8  59.1  133.1  41.0  439.0 
1846  209.7  73.0  182.8  56.9  522.4 
1847  287.7  51.7  225.3  26.8  591.6 
1848  240.8  41.5  170.0  20.1  472.4 
1849  214.7  36.7  144.8  18.1  414.2 
           
1850  190.6  38.9  155.8  20.3  405.7 
1851  202.9  44.3  169.5  29.2  445.8 
1852  220.1  43.2  217.4  41.9  522.6 
1853  242.5  49.9  326.9  41.6  660.9 
1854  293.4  50.5  374.7  52.5  771.1 
1855  306.1  54.7  433.8  54.7  849.3 
1856  316.5  58.5  485.6  62.6  923.1 
1857  318.7  54.6  554.8  64.2  992.3 
1858  278.1  48.2  494.0  51.2  871.6 
1859  291.4  42.1  481.7  49.3  864.4 
           
1860  274.7  41.8  526.5  55.3  898.4 
1861  237.1  38.9  620.8  70.1  966.9 
1862  239.5  34.4  736.6  80.3  1,090.8 
1863  223.4  32.7  813.2  87.5  1,156.9 
1864  211.0  13.5  908.7  79.5  1,212.8 
1865  180.7  13.2  936.3  73.5  1,203.7 
1866  168.8  15.4  984.7  91.5  1,260.3 
1867  141.4  13.8  989.7  84.2  1,229.0 
1868  120.7  10.6  1,029.4  74.6  1,235.3 
1869  98.9  13.8  1,193.3  75.0  1,381.0 
1870  77.8  12.1  1,022.1  66.1  1,178.1 
a 1819-1833 including 
b 
Sources: See Appendix.   46
Table 9 
Bar Iron Output in France, 1819-1870 in 1000 metric tons 
Year    with charcoal or 
mixed fuel 
with hard coal total  of this rails
a 
 
total of bar iron 
 
1819  73.2  1.0    74.2 
1822  71.2  15.0    86.2 
1824  99.6  42.1    141.7 
1825  102.5  41.1    143.5 
1826  104.9  40.6    145.5 
1827  104.5  44.4    148.9 
1828  102.8  48.6    151.4 
1829  108.0  45.7    153.6 
         
1830  101.6  46.9    148.5 
1831  101.3  39.8    141.1 
1832  99.2  44.3    143.5 
1833  99.2  53.1    152.3 
1834  102.1  75.1    177.2 
1835  108.2  101.4    209.5 
1836  110.9  99.7    210.6 
1837  110.0  114.6    224.6 
1838  109.1  115.1    224.2 
1839  101.8  130.0    231.8 
1840  103.3  134.1    237.4 
1841  110.4  153.4    263.7 
1842  109.8  175.0  27.8  284.8 
1843  114.7  193.7  28.5  308.4 
1844  108.5  206.5  36.9  315.0 
1845  108.5  233.8  46.5  342.3 
1846  105.9  254.3  53.7  360.2 
1847  97.0  279.7  88.7  376.7 
1848  72.4  203.8  72.8  276.3 
1849  73.2  170.3  41.2  243.5 
1850  73.5  172.7  23.1  246.2 
1851  82.0  172.1  27.1  254.2 
1852  74.1  227.1  60.5  301.8 
1853  101.0  350.0  94.7  451.0 
1854  93.9  417.2  135.8  511.1 
1855  100.3  456.9  147.9  557.2 
1856  105.0  463.7  163.1  568.7 
1857  103.3  456.6  153.7  560.0 
1858  102.5  427.6  141.1  530.1   47
1859  105.8  427.6  101.4  533.4 
1860  96.4  435.8  121.3  532.2 
1861  83.3  547.9  164.4  631.2 
1862  87.8  646.4  216.2  734.3 
1863  95.8  674.4  226.9  770.2 
1864  86.0  706.0  216.0  792.1 
1865  73.7  695.5  208.8  769.2 
1866  74.5  744.9  171.0  819.4 
1867  68.8  707.5  172.5  776.3 
1868  52.8  760.9  186.0  813.7 
1869  55.2  848.5  216.6  903.7 
1870  45.9  613.8  171.0  659.7 
a  before 1842 not seperately documented. 
Sources: see Appendix. 
 
3.3  Adaptations of the traditional sector  
 
Whereas Sweden succeeded in developing a completely alternative model traditional German and 
French regions, well endowed with iron ore and wood, could compete with the British iron technology 
only for a transitional period, covering several decades, though. In the following, I concentrate on 
adaptations of the traditional charcoal industry in France and touch upon Germany and Sweden, all of 
which formed their particular response to the British challenge of iron producing. 
 
Beyond imitation, the British model obtruded various strategies of adaptation onto the 
traditional iron industry. Hence this sector did not remain passive at all, but it underwent a development 
known from other sectors of industry as well, for instance from sailing ships: a technique becoming 
obsolete reaches its highest technical and productive level shortly before it disappears. Accordingly, 
calculations made for the Siegerland and Württemberg show that smelting iron with charcoal increased 
its productivity considerably in the decades from the 1820s to the 1850s, which is exactly the crucial 
period here.
8 This was achieved through extraordinary retrenchments on charcoal having the highest 
shares in the costs of smelting iron. In some traditional iron producing areas, even the output grew 
enormously during the crucial period. Only in the 1850s did this growth reveal itself as a short-lived 
success.  
 
And even then, several contemporary experts did not see it as certain at all, whether or not the 
traditional iron producing areas that used nothing but wood and iron ore would more or less sink into 
insignificance by the side of the large-scale technology coming from Britain.
9 
                                                 
8 See the calculations in Fremdling (1986, pp. 155-160). This statement is confirmed by using detailed Swedish 
data on the development of input and output prices: Whereas prices for charcoal, iron ore and labour increased 
between 1820 and 1855, the price for pig iron remained constant or increased only slightly. See Jörberg (1972), 
vol. I, pp. 197, 697 f., 702 f., 721 f.  
9 On this, see the results of an enquête, which was conducted in connection with the Cobden-Chevalier-treaty 
between France and United Kingdom. Gille (1968), pp. 211-32; ‘Rapport sur les droits spécifiques à établir sur les 
produits de manufactures Anglaises, en vertu du traité de commerce avec la Grande-Bretagne’. Archives 
Nationales F. 12 2483. See furthermore the failure of the charcoal iron producing ‘Société des Hauts Fourneaux et 
Forges de la Côte-d’Or’, in Jobert (1979).   48
The traditional iron industry struggled for survival by both increasing the productivity of 
smelting iron with charcoal and by elaborately integrating parts of the new technique. The small forges 
could for instance substitute the new puddling furnace for the old refining furnace without changing the 
rest of the operations (Figure 3: The Champagne model). Detached from the other modern techniques 
from Britain, the craft of puddling began spreading over many regions of the traditional iron industry, as 
early as the 1820s. As puddling furnaces were fuelled with coal, the charcoal was left only for the blast 
furnaces and the rise in charcoal prices was slowed down. These partial modernisations were widely 
spread over the most important regions with a traditional iron industry in Germany and France, namely 
the Siegerland and the Champagne. This holds partly true for Wallonia as well. The bar iron produced 
by mixing old and new techniques was of as good a quality as the traditional iron but much cheaper. At 
the beginning, the iron made by use of coal through and through had been of inferior quality and thus 




The Champagne model 
Process   
Stage of Production  traditional  modern 
 
Product 
Smelting in the blast furnace   
First Stage  with charcoal   
 
pig iron 
Refining   
Second Stage    in a puddling 
furnace with coal 
 
wrought iron 
Shaping   
  by the hammer   
 
bar iron (rails) 
 
The hot blast was a further means to render the coexistence of the traditional and the new 
technology possible for a long time. It was the most efficient single innovation at that time, increasing 
the productivity of both smelting with charcoal and with coke. Instead of taking cold air, heated air was 
blown into the blast furnace. In 1828, the Scot James Beaumont Neilson got a patent for this invention. 
The hot blast raised the temperature in the blast furnace, which thus made better use of the fuel. It soon 
turned out that Neilson’s innovation was of greatest advantage in regions with the highest fuel prices. 
Within Great Britain this holds for Scotland, which speedily proceeded to install the hot blast. During 
the short period from 1829 to 1833, Scotland took the place of South Wales in being the cheapest 
supplier of pig iron. Concerning Britain’s ability to compete against the Continental iron industry, 
however, Neilson’s innovation soon proved to be a disadvantage. With the high fuel prices on the 
Continent it was logical that Neilson’s hot blast spread very fast there. As early as the middle of the 
1830s, numerous blast furnaces in Belgium, France and Germany worked with the hot blast. And in 
France, this innovation spread even faster than in Britain (Fremdling 2000, p. 216, and Table 10). It 
could also be applied to charcoal blast furnaces with advantage, thereby extending their survival. In 
addition, a highly important supplementary innovation was introduced there. For a long time, the gases 
generated with smelting had been uselessly burnt off. In the 1830s, devices were installed to utilise the 
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blast furnace gases for heating the air of the blower. The small iron industry of Württemberg based on 
charcoal was on top of this development (Plumpe 1982). Soon the modern coke blast furnace proceeded 
to utilise the blast furnace gases as well. This is a clear case of cross-fertilisation between traditional and 
modern methods. Economising on fuel like this both protected the traditional iron sector from the rising 
coal iron industry and also shielded the more cost-intensive coal districts from the less expensive. 
Nevertheless, during the 1860s, charcoal using iron works retreated into niches and barely covered 10 
per cent of the production of pig iron both in Germany and France (Fremdling 2000, p. 212). 
 
Table 10 
The diffusion of the Hot Blast in France, 1837-1844 
3.4  Blast Furnaces fueled 





























1837  30  23  14  11  11  8  502  433  38 
1838  33  22  15  11  11  5  514  432  55 
1839  33  23  15  10  10  4  526  445  71 
1840  40  28  19  14  13  9  527  421  74 
1841  43  32  24  11  10  10  519  426  78 
1842  45  35  30  16  16  9  530  418  78 
1843  45  37  31  26  25  8  526  409  108 
1844  50  38  31  26  23  8  518  369  115 
Sources: See Appendix. 
 
Sweden boasted of abundant iron ore, wood and sufficient waterpower for driving rolling mills. 
It did not dispose of coal resources, though. And the large Swedish iron industry based on charcoal was 
located too far from the coast or navigable rivers to allow the import of coal. 
 
Given these conditions, Sweden found her particular way of responding to the challenge of the 
new British iron production (see Rydén’s chapter in this book). Rydén concludes ‘that we should 
perhaps give more weight to a more developed machine-making technology and industrial organisation 
than to the actual use of mineral coal. A charcoal response to coal technology implicates that industrial 
production was possible even when no coal was available.’  
 
The persistent differences of technology between Britain and the Continent in iron making  -  either 
permanently [as in Sweden and similarly in Austria (Paulinyi, 1974)] or for a long transitional period [in 
France and Germany]  -  demonstrate, that Britain was not merely the first but furthermore (nearly) the 
only country, that completely proceeded to coal-based techniques before the coming of the railway. 
(Belgium has to be seen as an exception to the other Continental iron industries.) Britain thus went her 
own, unique path to the Industrial Revolution. At least for the 18
th century and for long periods before   50
the coming of the new liquid steel  processes in the second half of the 19
th  century [Bessemer, 
Thomas/Gilchrist and the open-hearth method (Siemens-Martin)], her exceptionalism holds true. 
 
4  A sketch of an explanatory framework 
 
Placing the case of the iron industry in a somewhat broader theoretical framework makes the British 
uniqueness even more palpable. 
 
The iron industry  –  and probably other technological breakthroughs in Britain as well  –  could 
be seen as examples of leapfrogging, which has gained prominence in the recent literature on growth 
processes (Brezis et al. 1993). The rather slow transfer of the modern iron techniques to continental 
Europe certainly fits this theoretical concept of comparing countries catching up and forging ahead. But 
the competitors did not have the same ‘buck-horses’, which were not placed in one row and one 
direction, at that. For we witness the persistence of technological differences with an alternative 
sequence or path of productivity development in certain regions of the Continent. For these deviating 
paths of development Broadberry’s approach to technological differences between the United States of 
America and Great Britain in the 20
th century could probably be used analogously. Broadberry (1997, 
chapter 6) explains the productivity gap between the US and the UK by applying an evolutionary model 
of technical change, which integrates David’s concept of path dependency with Mokyr’s distinction 
between macro- and micro-inventions. 
 
To illuminate the British-Continental dichotomy (thereby neglecting differences among the 
Continentals countries), I ‘translated’ a part of Broadberry’s text (1997, pp. 77f.) to the case of the 
former iron production by merely replacing a few words:  ‘Great Britain’ is substituted for ‘New 
World’, ‘coal’ for ‘land/resource abundance’ and ‘wood’ for ‘skilled labour’. The substitutes are written 
in cursive fat letters, followed by the originals in brackets. 
 
The starting point is the Rothbarth-Habbakuk thesis, which traces the origin of trans-channel 
(transatlantic) technological  differences to  coal abundance (land and resource abundance) in 
Britain (the New World). … British (American) manufacturing substituted coal (resource-using 
machinery) for wood (skilled labour), which was in short supply in Britain (the New World). In 
some Continental countries (Europe), however, wood (skilled labour) was abundant and coal  
(resources) scarce, so the Continental (European) technology remained wood-intensive (skilled 
labour-intensive). … However, whereas  Landes (Chandler) sees a uniqe best technology and 
assesses Continental (French and German) industry according to how quickly they adopted 
British  (American) methods, I follow the … literature in noting that competitive advantage 
requires developing distinctive capabilities rather than slavishly copying. Technical change 
within each country is therefore best seen as a path dependent process, with all countries able to 
draw on a common pool of knowledge but developing distinctive capabilities and adapting 
innovations to local circumstances. Finally, some common trends in the development of 
technology in all countries are noted.’ 
 
Most of Broadberry’s argumentation and even figures on the further pages in chapter 6 can be 
applied to the case study on the iron industry, similarly modified. In analogy to Broadberry’s figures (on   51
pp. 85 ff.), the point ‘A’ in figure 6.3 was reached in Belgium, France and Germany at least around 
1860. Hence, the wood-intensive technology had by then become obsolete there, but definitely not in 
Sweden.  
 
Touching upon the implicit comparison between the iron industry then and other technological 
transfers in another space and time, places the persistence of technological differences between Great 
Britain and successful Continental countries until far into the 19
th century theoretically into the tradition 
of the Rothbarth-Habbakuk-thesis. This provides an explanation of why there were different paths 
leading to modern economic growth into the 20
th century.   52
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The iron export data are to be found in the respective yearly volume of the Parliamentary Papers. For the 
years from 1821 to 1870 the following issues were used to compile the time series; 1825 XXI; 1829 
XVII; 1830-31 X; 1831-32 XXXIV; 1833 XXXIII; 1835 XLVIII; 1839 XLVI; 1840 XLIV; 1842 
XXXIX; 1843 LII; 1844 XLV; 1845 LXVI; 1846 XLIV; 1847-48 LVIII; 1849 L; 1851 LIII; 1854 
LXVI; 1854-55 LI; 1856 LVI; 1857 XXXV; 1857-58 LIV; 1859 XXVIII; 1860 LXIV; 1861 LX; 1862 
LVI; 1863 LXV; 1864 LVII; 1865 LII; 1866 LXVIII: 1867 LXVI; 1867-68 LXVII; 1868-69 LVIII; 
1870 LXIII;  1871 LXIII p. ii. 
British export statistics classify countries according to the sea port a cargo was sent to. For example iron 
imports of the Rhineland from Britain, which were sent to the Rhine, therefore appear in the British 
statistics as exports to Holland. That is why Holland is always included to assess British exports to 
Germany. 
British iron exports to Ireland, the Channel Island and the Isle of Man were subtracted from the total, 




Ministère du Commerce et des Manufactures, Enquête sur les fers, Paris 1829, pp. 21, 23; Douanes 
Royales de France, Tableau des quantités et de la valeur approximative des marchandises étrangères 
importées en France pour la consommation pendant l’année...., Paris..., Years 1820-1824; 
Administration des Douanes, Tableau général du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les 




On the production figures see various issues of the French mineral statistics which were published under 
different headings from 1834 onwards. Direction générale des Ponts et Chaussées et des Mines, Compte 
rendu des travaux des ingenieurs des mines pendant l’année... (1833-1835), Paris, 1834-1836; ministère 
du Commerce et des Travaux publics, direction générale des Ponts et Chaussées et des Mines, Résumé 
des travaux statistiques... (1835-1836), Paris, 1836-1837; ministère des Travaux publics et des 
Commerce, Résumé des travaux statistiques de l’administration des mines en... (1837-1846), Paris, 
1838-1847; ministère de l’Agriculture, du Commerce et des Travaux publics, direction des  Mines, 
Résumé des travaux statistiques de l’administration des mines en .... (1847-1872), Paris 1854-1877. On 
the foreign trade figures see Administration des Douanes, Tableau général du commerce de la France 




On the production figures see Marchand, Hans, Säkularstatistik der deutschen Eisenindustrie, Essen 
1939, pp. 88, 115, 129. On the foreign trade figures see Ferber, C.W., Beiträge zur Kenntniß des   57
gewerblichen und commerciellen Zustandes der preußischen Monarchie, Berlin 1829, pp. 29 ff.; Ferber, 
C.W., Neue Beiträge..., 1832, p. 23; Dieterici, C.F.W., Statistische Übersicht der wichtigsten 
Gegenstände des Verkehrs und Verbrauchs im preußischen Staate und im deutschen Zollverbande, in 
dem Zeitraume von 1831 bis 1836, Berlin 1848, p. 95; Sering, Max., Geschichte der preussisch-




Le Ministre de l’intérieur, Statistique générale de la Belgique, Exposé de la situation du Royaume, 
période décennale de 1841-1850, 1851-1860, Brussels 1852, 1865; 
Commission central de statistique, Exposé de la situation du Royaume de 1861 à 1875, Brussels 1885; 
Ministère de l’intérieur et des affaires étrangères, Tableau général du commerce de la Belgique avec les 




1811, 1828: Calculated from detailed reports, see Pluymers (1992), Pluymers (1993), Gales/Fremdling 
(1994) and Fremdling/Gales (1994). 
1822/1825: Informed guesses, see Gales/Fremdling  (1994, p. 310). 
1830-1844: until 1842 estimated by Pluymers (1992/93), for 1843/44 he uses figures from the official 
statistics, but they deviate from Fremdling (1986, p. 78). 

















See Table 3. For other years no data are reported.   58
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